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NOTES
APPORTIONMENT OF PROCEEDS OF DELAYED CONVERSION BETWEEN LIFE TENANT AND REMAINDERMAN OF A TRUST:
RATE OF INTEREST IN COMPUTING INCOME LOSS.
Since the economic debacle of 1929 many questions in the law of trusts have
reached the courts whikh previously had demanded no consideration by them.
Perhaps outstanding in perplexity have been those queries presented by trustees
as to the distribution of proceeds of the sale of land which came into the trustees' hands through foreclosure of a trust mortgage in default. A typical situation is this: A dies, and by his will directs the investment of $10,000
of his personal property to be held in trust by B, income therefrom to be paid to
C during his lifetime and at C's death, the corpus of the trust to be paid to D.
B properly invests the money in a mortgage on which subsequently the interest
falls in arrears. On the foreclosure sale, the trustee buys in the property for the
protection of the trust estate, holds it several years, and sells it at a loss. The
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trustee is then faced with the distribution of proceeds of this sale. The difficulties and problems attached thereto are multiple and complex and quite sufficient
to cause any capable and thoughtful trustee to ask the court's aid in the solution
thereof. It was just such a situation which brought into court the case of
Nirdlinger's Estate,1 decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on July 7, 1937.
Out of such a situation may arise the necessity of determining as between the life
tenant and the remainderman the incidence of costs of foreclosure, of delinquent
taxes, of carrying charges during the period the property was held by the trustee,
and concurrently their respective rights in the proceeds of the ultimate sale by
the trustee. Recognizing the innumerable ramifications of the few problems
above mentioned, the scope of this note will lye confined to one feature of the
allocation of the proceeds of the ultimate sale, which is peculiarly perplexing and
upon which there is considerable divergence of judicial expression, - the rate of
interest to be used in computing the loss of income to the life tenant, which
latter sum must be found before proper allocation and apportionment can proceed.
By this time the weight of authority is overwhelmingly in favor of the view
that as between the life tenant and the remainderman there should be an apportionment of the proceeds of this sale. 2 The investment by the trustee in the
mortgage is for the benefit of both life tenant and remainderman. The security
was given for the benefit of principal and income, the hazard of risk is borne by
both the legatee for life and in remainder, and so when there is a loss sustained by reason of an unfortunate investment, the income as well as the corpus
is thereby depleted and the loss falls on both.3 At this point, however, the unanimity of decision ceases and each court proceeds upon its owxa theory, which may
or may not be founded in reason or justice.
As to the rate of interest upon which the life tenant's share of the proceeds
is to be computed there are five conceivable solutions, four of which have at
least some claim to merit: 4 (1) From the date of default upon the mortgage
until the date of ultimate sale the life tenant should be allowed no interest whatsoever; (2) the life tenant should be allowed interest at the mortgage rate until
the date of foreclosure and no interest between that date and the date of the
ultimate sale; (3) the life tenant should be allowed the mortgage rate of in1327 Pa. 171 (1937). It might be noted here that the rules hereinafter discussed are equally
applicable to the situation where the testator leaves to the trustee an unproductive mortgage and
the situation where the trustee properly invests in a mortgage which thereafter becomes unproductive.
2Hagan v. Platt, (1891) 48 N. J. Eq. 259, 24 Atl. 1; Re Chapal, (1936) 269 N. Y. 464,
199 N.

E. 762; Nirdlinger's Estate,

Bank v. Woodruff,

(1937)

SGraham's Estate, (1901)

(1937)

327 Pa.

N. J. Ch., 194 At.

266.

171, 193

At.

30; Hudson Co. National

Annotation, 103 A. L. R. 1289.

198 Pa. 216, 218; 47 AtI. 1108, 1109.

4The American Law Institute's Restatement of Trusts, Tentative Draft No. 4, at page 221
apparently assumes there are but two methods in use. Bailey and Rice, "Duties of a Trustee
With Respect to Defaulted Mortgage Investments," 84 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 157 at page 173,
recognize three methods.
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terest throughout the period of default until the date of sale; (4) the life tenant
should be allowed the mortgage rate until the date of foreclosure and the prevailing rate for trust investments generally from the date of foreclosure untii
the date of ultimate sale; (5) the life tenant should be allowed the prevailing
rate of interest throughout the period of default until the date of ultimate sale.
The first of these solutions is the only one which apparently has no claim
of merit. Neither text writers nor case authority support this view which is
obviously incorrect and inequitable, and which would result in benefit to the
remainderman at the expense of the life tenant. This should not be, for as far as
possible, the one should not profit at the other's expense. 5
The second method propounded would seem to have some case law support.
In the English case of Moore v. Johnson, In re Moore,6 the trustees had invested
8000 pounds on mortgage, but interest was not regularly paid for some years,
and the trustees foreclosed. There was 536 pounds arrears of interest due to the
date of foreclosure. In 1852 the property was subsequently sold for 7900
pounds. The court held that the apportionment would be in the proportion
that 8000 pounds of principal bore to 536 pounds of interest, and allowed the
life tenant no interest between the time of foreclosure and the date of ultimate
sale.' This case has been widely miscited.8 One of the most recent cases discussing this rule is In Re Pelcyger's Estate.' Surrogate Wingate expresses the
opinion that this is the correct rule, but in the actual decision of the case before
him he is bound to follow prior New York cases from the court of last resort
of that state, which latter decisions support another of these proposed solutions.
In support of his reasoning the Surrogate necessarily applies a strict construction
to the terms of the trust as usually created- that the "cestui que trust is by
will given 'the income' of the trust estate 'as and when the same accrues'." u °
Therefore, he feels that the life tenant is not entitled to any interest after the
date of foreclosure since in fact there has been no income. Further, he contends
it is indulging in too much legal fiction to assert that in spite of the fact that the
original investment in the bond and mortgage had ceased to exist by foreclosure,
1he income beneficiary is still entitled to interest thereon. As he argues,
"The right to receive interest either legally or equitably implies the
indispensable correlative of a person obligated to pay it, but in the
situation under discussion there is no such obligor. It is not the
original mortgagor, since he has been permanently discharged from
5

In Re Pelcyger's Estate, (1936) 285 N. Y. Supp. 739.
654 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 432 (1885).
'As per report in Re Pelcyger's Estate, (Surr.) 285 N. Y.fSupp. 739.
8
See note 17 infra.
9285 N. Y. Supp. 723.
'OId. at 747.
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any connection with the matter. On all primary rules it cannot be
the remainderman or his property. The result of its allowance,
therefore, is precisely what Judge Pearson refused to do in Re Moore,
namely, to 'take it out of other people's money to pay him'."' 1
Persuasive as these arguments may sound, the learned Surrogate is completely
ignoring the doctrine of equitable conversion as applicable here, and also the
fact recognized by the Pennsylvania courts that in nearly all instances of long
continuing trusts the life tenants are the primary objects of the bounty of the
testators,12 and their incomes should be preserved to them. For these reasons
the arguments which he urges do not commend themselves to our best judgment.
The third proposed m'ethod is to allow the life tenant interest at the mortgage rate for the entire period of default until the ultimate sale. This rule has
the following of a consistent line of cases in New Jersey,18 and is the rule in
use in Ndw York. 14 The most recent New York case, In re Otis' Will,15 decided by the Court of Appeals on November 23, 1937, is the first New York
Court of Appeals case to discuss ,.t any length the reasons for adopting this
rule, and those reasons presented are not forceful. In this particular case the
Surrogate court i" and the Appellate Division 17 had applied a rule allowing interest at the mortgage rate until the date of foreclosure and at the "current rate"
thereafter. (The application of this rule is more fully discussed later). The
Court of Appeals suggests what is "doubtless the completely fair thing to do"
which, however, they add is beyond the field of practicality. 18 Noting these
difficulties they then apply the rule above set forth. Precisely the same objection
can be raised to the decision as was stated concerning the arguments of the
learned Surrogate in Pelcyger's Estate - it overlooks the doctrine of equitable
conversion. An anomoly presents itself in the line of New Jersey cases. They
all rely eventually on the authority of Hagan v. Platt,19 which in turn finds its
foundation in In Re AMoore 20 wrongly read, which in fact denied to the life
tenant any allowance for interest after the date of foreclosure. 21 The New
11285 N. Y. Supp. 723, at 746.
l2Nirdlinger's Estate, 327 Pa. 171, 173.
"SHagan v. Platt, 48 N. J. Eq. 206, 21 Atl. 860; Skinner v. Boyd, 98 N. J. Eq. 55, 130 At.
22; Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Donnelly, 65 N. J. Eq. 119, 55 At. 92; 'I'll re Tuttle,
49 N. J. Eq. 259, 24 At. 1; Hudson County National Bank v. Woodruff, '194 Atd. 266.
141n re Otis' Will, 276 N. Y. 101, 11 N. E. 2d 556 (N. Y. Supp. Adv. Sh. January 4. 1938);
Meldon v. Devlin, 167 N. Y. 573, affirming 53 N. Y. Supp. 172;. 1A re Pelcyger's Estate, 285
N. Y. Supp. 723.
15276
16287
17295
18276

N. Y.
N. Y.
N. Y.
N. Y.

101, 11 N. E. 2d 556 (N.
Supp. 758.
Supp. 754.
101, at 112.

1948 N. J, Eq. 206, 21 Atl. 860.
2054 L. J. Ch. 432 (1885).

21Facts supra at note 8.

Y,

Supp. Adv. Sh. Jan. 4, 1938).
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Jersey cases adopt the rule from precedent, without any discussion of the reasons
for adopting it. The learned Surrogate in Pelcyger's Estate,22 recognizing that
prior New York decisions from the court of last resort of that state had granted
to the life tenant interest until the date of ultimate sale, decided that in the case
before him the rate should be consistent throughout, and should be the mortgage rate. In his words:
"The whole theory of the allowance of interest, as such, at all, is
that the vanished obligation continues its existence until the date of
the final liquidation. If this theory is to be considered valid in any
connection, it should apply throughout, and the rate therein should
govern." 23
This is about the only discussion of the application of this rule which can be
found in the reported cases. Based in the beginning on the erroneous reading
of an early case, there seems to be little reasoning behind it. Fairness and justice demand rather the adoption of another policy yet to be discussed.
The fourth rule suggested is claimed to be the rule which should be adopted
on principle. 2 ' Here interest is allowe, to the life tenant at the mortgage rate
until the date of foreclosure, and thereafter interest is allowed to him at the
prevailing rate for trust investments gcnerally. This view was adopted by the
lower court in Nirdlinger's Estate.25 Its cause can be argued with considerable
effectiveness. As previously suggested, at first glance there might be entertained
some doubt as to whether the life tenant should be entitled to any interest after
the date of foreclosure. But it must be remembered that the mortgage was given
28
as security for both principal and income.
"When, therefore, it becomes necessary to foreclose on the security,
the property thus acquired should continue to be treated like the
debt which the trustees are trying to save. This is recognized in
the doctrine of equitable conversion, according to which the land
acquired on foreclosure by the trustees is regarded as personal property in their hands. If both principal and arrears cannot be saved,
they both should bear the pro rata loss, because they are pro rata
27
owners."
22285 N. Y. Supp. 723.
2
s1n Re Pelcyger's Estate, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723, 752. At page 746 Surrogate Wingate works
out an example illustrating to his satisfaction the inequity of allowing any interest to the life tenant

after the date of foreclosure.
24

Bailey and Rice, supra, 84 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 176.
2526 D. & C. (Pa.) 3.
2
6Bailey and Rice, supra, 84 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 176.
2
tNirdlinger's Estate, 26 D. & C. (Pa). 3, 8.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

The conversion doctrine is an application of the well-known maxim that "equity
regards as done that which ought to be done." Unquestionably the life tenant
is entitled to immediate liquidation of an unprofitable investment and the reinvestment of the proceeds in income producing security. Yet the interests of
the remainderman are to be considered on a par with those of the life tenant,
and frequently because of conditions beyond the control of the trustee, immediate liquidation is impossible and may not occur for a considerable time.
So, to protect the interests of the life tenant, equity regards as done that which
ought to be done, and by virtue of the doctrine of equitable conversion finds
the life tenant entitled to a share of the proceeds of the ultimate sale on the
same basis as if the investment had been liquidated at the date of foreclosure.
His share is computed at the rate allowed for trust investments generally, as if
the proceeds had in fact been reinvested at the date of foreclosure. Under this
analysis the rate of interest for trust investments generally is the only logical
one to adopt for the period following foreclosure.28 Furthermore, the adoption
of such a doctrine seems to be justified in view of the not unwarranted probability that the income beneficiary was the primary object of the settlor's
bounty.29 The rule is the most meritorious of those yet considered, and from
a practical standpoint is relatively easy of application. It is a matter of wonder
that this rule has not acquired a greater following and the support of text
writers. However, if it is accepted that in all fairness the doctrine of equitable
conversion is applicable here, then the result achieved by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Nirdlinger'sEstate80 seems even better than this fourth proposition.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted what is here termed rule number
five. This rule allows interest to the life tenant at the rate for trust investments
generally, from the "date of default" until the date of ultimate sale. It is the
rule adopted by the American Law Institute in the Restatement of Trusts. 81
As pronounced in section 241 of the Restatement, the rule reads:
"The net proceeds received from the sale of the property are apportioned by ascertaining the sum which with interest thereon at
the current rate of return on trust investments from the day when
the duty to sell arose to the day of the sale would equal the net
proceeds; and the sum so ascertained is to be treated as principal,
and the residue of the net proceeds as income. The net proceeds

2

SBailey and Rice, supra, 84 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 177.
29Nirdlinger's Estate, 327 Pa. 171, 173.
80327 Pa. 171.
31Restatement of Trusts, sec.241.
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are determined by adding to the net sale price the net income received or deducting therefrom the net loss incurred in carrying the
property prior to the sale."
Comment (b) of this section and Illustration 4 thereof say that trust mortgages
are within the scope and operation of the rule. As is noted by the drafting
committee of the Restatement of Trusts the result under this rule or under the
third rule (allowing the mortgage rate for the entire period) will be identical
if it should happen that the interest rate reserved in the mortgage is the "current
rate" for trust investments generally. The Restatement committee itself found
little case law to support their rule," but on reason the rule can well be sustained. Its adoption by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 33 carries one step further
to its proper limit the doctrine applied by the lower court in Nirdlinger's Estate.3"
The lower court applied the doctrine of equitable conversion as of the date of
foreclosure. The opinion of the Supreme Court recognizes this doctrine and the
maxim "equity regards as done that which ought to be done," but adopts the
logical conclusion that the doctrine should be applied as of the date when the
interest on the mortgage fell in arrears. Certain it is that as soon as the interest fell in arrears the life tenant was entitled to have the trustee liquidate
and reinvest the funds immediately in income producing securities. So, applying the equitable maxim, equity finds the life tenant entitled to a share of the
proceeds of the ultimate sale equivalent to that sum which he would have received had the trustee liquidated the unprofitable investment and immediately
Xreinvested it in income producing securities at the moment the interest on the
mortgage fell in arrears. What could be more logical? If the doctrine of
equitable conversion is to be applied to the situation, it seems only just and
proper that it should be applied throughout the problem, not just in the limited
use given it by the lower court in the same case. The objection has been made
that if the rule of the American Law Institute were adopted, where the "current
rate is adopted as of the date of default, the necessity arises of determining that
exact date and needlessly presents a potential difficulty in the already complicated
The objection seems academic. Although it is
process of apportionment.'"'3
true that interest accrues from day to day, when a payment on interest is made
it is made to cover a specific period, e. g. the quarter ending June 1, and if no
interest is paid thereafter there would seem to be little difficulty in determining
when the interest fell in arrears, and consequently when the duty to sell arose
2

S Restatement of Trusts, Ten. Draft No. 4, Explan. notes, p. 221; Parsons v. Winslow, 16
Mass. 361; Roosevelt v. Roosevelt, 5 Redf. 264, (N. Y.); Greene v. Greene, 19 R. 1. 619; Cox
v. Cox, L. R. 8 Eq. 343.

S3Nirdlinger's Estate, 327 Pa. 171.
84 Nirdlinger's Estate, 26 D. & C. (Pa.) 3.
35Note: 86 U.- of Pa. Law Rev. 109, at 110.
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on the part of the trustee. The adoption of the rule laid down by the Restatement and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has the added advantage of bringing
into harmony the rule relating to delayed conversion of a defaulted mortgage
investment held in trust and the rule relating to delayed conversion of unproductive trust property in the hands of a trustee, as pronounced in Edwards v.
Edwards, 6 cited in discussion of the rule in sec. 241 of the Restatement of
Trusts.37
In conclusion it might be added that the rule of the Restatement of Trusts
as adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is a close parallel to that
adopted by the Uniform Principal and Income Act to cover a similar situation."
In fact, it has been asserted that the two rules are the same. 39 This last is a slight
misstatement, however. The Uniform Principal and Income Act, section 11,
adopts an arbitrary rate of 5%. The similarity of the two rules is that both
adopt for the entire period of default a uniform rate, which is not the rate
expressed in the mortgage, and, too, the rate used in the Uniform Act was
chosen as the rate representative of the average investment return rate.
It is to be hoped that the result reached by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will be noticed and followed when the problem arises again in this and
other jurisdictions. This is desirable not solely to achieve uniformity of judicial
operation, although that is desirable as far as feasible, but also because it is the
40
rule which stands up best under tests of reason and justice.
Robert McK. Glass

36183 Mass. 581, 67 N. E. 658.
37
Restatement of Trusts, Ten. Draft No. 4, p. 220, Explanatory notes of sec. 233 (sec. 241
of the Final Draft).
384 Bogert: "Trusts and Trustees", sec. 827, note 81.
39Note: 86 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 109.
40The case of In Re Myers' Estate, 161 N. Y', Supp. 1111 (1916), not otherwise reported,
which is sometimes cited in discussion of this subject, has been studiously and purposely avoided
because the reported case does not show whether the court adopted the "current rate" or
mortgage rate of interest. Any statement a to which was used' is conjecture. One recent New
York case (In Re Pelcyger's Estate, 285 N. Y. Supp. 723, 741) says the court in the Myers' case
purported to apply the "current rate" throughout. The most for which the case can be cited
safely is the proposition that upon delayed conversion there should be an apportionment of the
proceeds between life tenant and remainderman.

